GAS AND WATER COMPANIES.

Where water mains are laid by authority of a city, which
supplies its inhabitants, and a consumer connects with the street
main, paying for the laying of the same and water rents for two
years and the water freezes in the main, because of its being
left too near the surface of the ground, in consequence of which
the connections burst and the tenants of said consumer leave,
because they are unable to obtain water, it has been decided that
such consumer could recover the water rents paid and no more:
Smith v. Philadelphia,81 Pa. St. 38.
The introduction of water by a city into private houses, is not
upon the footing of a contract, but c F a license, which is paid
for: Tainter v. Morcester, 123 Mlass. :;11.
The claim that gas is of poor quality, is no defence to an
action to recover for gas supplied: Great Central Gas Consumers' Cb. v. Tallis, 3 Gas. J. 5; Torquay Gas Co. v. Carter, 32
Gas. J. 5.
Mandamus is the proper remedy for compelling a supply of
gas or water: Price v. Riverside Land & I. Co., 56 Cal. 431 ;
Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. 60; The People v. _anhattan G.
L. Co., 45 Barb. 137.
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RECENT ENGLISH CASE.

.iigh Court of Justice, Chancery Division.
BROWN v. ALABASTER.
Where, during unity of possession, a particular and defined way is formed
and used over property which is afterwards seveed and granted by the owner
to ditILrent persons, the right of using the way as it is then used may pass by
implication, although it be not a way of necessity, and although the general
words of the conveyance are not sufficient to pass such right.
An owner of land erected three houses thereon facing a road, with gardens
at the back. Behind these ran a way which gave access from the gardens of
two of the houses to a side road, which ran at right angles to the front road
on the other side of the third house. The owner assigned to the defendant
the plots of land with the two houses thereon, "with their rights, easements,
and appurtenances," and afterwards assigned to the plaintiff the third plot,
the dimensions of which comprised so much of the way as lay between the two
other plots and the side road. The gardens of the defendant's houses could
also be reached from the road in front by two passages, but these were unsuitable for carrying away rubbish, etc., from the gardens. The plaintiff disputed
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the defendant's right to use the way over his land to the side road: .Held,
that the defendant was not entitled to this as a way of necessity, but that the
right of using the way passed to him by implied grant from the owner,
although the general word. in the assignment to him were not sufficient to
pass such right.

W. Lr'rs, being possessed for a term of years of a plot of
land situateat the corner of Augusta-road and Park-road, at Moseley, in the parish of King's Norton, Worcestershire, erected
thereon three houses facing on Park-road. One of these, called
"Normanhurst," which belonged to the plaintiff, was situate at
the angle formed by the two roads. The house next to it was
called "Cottisbrook," and beyond it a third, called "Westbourne." Both these houses belonged to the defendant. The
three plots of land on which the houses respectively stood, were
in the shape of a long parallelogram, and each of the houses had
a garden at the back. The main entrances to the houses were
from Park-road, but both Cottisbrook and Westbourne had
also entrances leading to the house from the road by a passage which ran along the side of each house, that to Cottisbrook
running between it and Normanhurst, and that to Westbourne
running along its further side. These passages ended in a culde-sac, and then turned inwards at right angles, passing through
a portion of the buildings, and thus led into the gardens at the
back. They were four feet wide, paved with encaustic tiles, and
were approached from Park-road by one step, with two steps of
descent into the gardens. They were closed with doors at each
end, and, at their passage through the buildings, they had doors
on the right and left hand, which communicated with the hall
on the one side and with the offices on the other.
There was also another means-of access to the gardens of Cottisbrook and Westbourne, as to which the action arose, being
through a way which ran parallel to Park-road along the plot
of land at the lower end of the gardens into Augusta-road. It
was walled in, and bad a door at the road, and also two doors
in the wall which gave access to the gardens of Cottisbrook and
Wc-tbourne.
The assignments of these properties by Letts and his mortgagees to the defendant was dated the 14th of December, 1878,
and the pieces of land were thereby expressed to be assigned
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"together with the two messuages or dwelling-houses erected
thereon, with their rights, casements, and appurtenances."
The plaintiff derived his title to Nornianhurst under an
indenture of the 13th day of November, 1879, by which Letts
assigned that piece of land and the messuage thereon to the
plaintiff's vendor. The parcels Nere therein described as those
comprised in the original lease of that portion of the land to
Letts, dated the 5th of October, 1877, in which the piece of
land was described as being of a certain length on each side, and
as containing so many square yards. These dimensions included
so much of the site of the way behind the gardens as lay between Augusta-road and the opposite limit of the Normanburst property. And the indenture of the 13th of November,
1879, contained no reservation by Letts of any right of way
over the same. The way had been formed and existed in its
present state prior to either of the above assignments by Letts,
and had been used by the defendant since he acquired his two
houses. The plaintiff disputed his right of using the way, and
brought this action, claiming a declaration that the defendant
was not entitled, as against him, to any right of way from or to
his houses over or across his land to or from Augusta-road, and
that he, his agents and servants, might be restrained from passing over or otherwise trespassing upon the plaintiff's land.
A surveyor and house agent, who was called on behalf of the
plaintiff to prove a plan of the properties, said, in cross-examination, that in his opinion the passages to the gardens of Cottisbrook and Westbourne from Park-road were unsuitable for the
carrying away of rubbish, etc., from the gardens, and that the
use of the way at the back of the gardens was convenient for the
occupiers of those two houses.
Jfethold, for the plaintiff.
llfarten, Q. C., and Horace Browne, for the defendant.
KAY, J. (after stating the facts and describing the position of
the properties).-The qu stion is whether the indenture of the
14th of December, 1878, passes a right of way from the gardens
of Cottisbrook and Westbourne through this passage into Augusta-road. When this assignment was made, this right of way
was in no sense an easement. The question, therefore, is two-
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fold, (1) was it a way of necessity, and (2) did it pass by implied
grant under the assignment? As away of necessity it would be
difficult for the defendant to sustain the right, for a way of necessity is not a right of passing over a defined way, but is merely
a direct means of access to a tenement, and it is clearly established that a grantor is entitled to elect what course such a way
shall follow. There is no question of any election in this case,
the right claimed is to pass over a particular road, which is
enough to show that it is not a way of necessity. If it were
such a way, then, whether formed or not, a way would have
passed with the property. That is to say, if there had been no
back doors, and access to the gardens had only been through the
tiled passages, in such case if the owners of Cottisbrook and
*Vestbourne were held to be entitled to a way of necessity to
their gardens, then the owner of Westbourne would be entitled to
a way over both Cottisbrook and Normanhurst, and the owner
of Cottisbrook to a way over Normanhurst alone. It would be
impossible to hold that having already a way to the road in front
through the tiled passages, they were also entitled to a way in
some direction or other from the gardens to the other road. I
am therefore of opinion that this is not a way of necessity.
Then comes the question whether this right of way will pass,
as a continuous and apparent easement, by implied grant. It is
stated in Gale on Easements, that a right of way is not a continuous easement, but no authority is given for the statement.
In linehI fe v. The Earl of Kinnoul, 5 Bing. N. C. 1, a lessee
claimed a right of way over a passage on one side of his house
which communicated with a coal-shoot and with certain pipes
for conveying water and soil from the house. These formed
part of the tenement, I'or TINDAL, C.J., in giving judgment, says,
at p. 24: "We cannot, therefore, feel any doubt but that, under
the description contained in the lease, the coal-shoot and the
several pipes passed to the lessee as a constituent part of the
messuage or dwelling-house itself."
Now there was in that case another means of approaching the
coal-shoot over the tenement, but the jury found that the passage was not merely convenient, but necessary, for the use of the
coal-shoot, and there is this passage in the judgment, at p. 25 :
"Since, therefore, as it appears to us, the right in question passed
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to the lessees under the reversionary lease of 1819, as incidental
to the enjoyment of that which was the clear and manifest subject-matter of the demise, it becomes unnecessary to consider the
question argued at the bar before us, how far the same right
might or might not pass to the lessees under the express words
used in the lease itself as 'an appurtenant unto the said piece or
parcel of ground, messuage, or tenement, erections, buildings,
and premises, belonging, or appertaining.' There are strong
authorities in the law books to show these words capable of a
wider interpretation, and of carrying more than is an appurtenant in the strictly legal sense of thatword, where such interpretation is necessary in order to give that word some operation."
And after a reference to the authorities the judgment continues:
"But we think it at once sufficient, and at the same time safer,
to rely upon the ground on which we have already held that the
right claimed by the plaintiff may be supported, and to give no
opinion upon this second point." That ground having been
stated on p. 24 to be that "upon the facts found in the special
verdict, such right did pass as a necessary incident to the subjectmatter actually demised, although not specially named in the
lease. The rule laid down in Plowden's Comm., 16a, is, "that"
by the grant of anything, concedituret id, sine qud res ipsa haberi
non potest."
Therefore, in that case the way was really a way of necessity.
That decision has often since been commented on and followed.
In Langley v. Hammond, 16 W. R. 937; s. c. L. R. 3 Ex.
161, there was a grant of part of certain demised premises,
"together with all ways, etc., therewith now used, occupied,
and enjoyed," and Lord BRAMWELL, in giving judgment, said:
"Suppose a house to stand one hundred yards from a highway,
and to be approached by a road running along the side of a
field, used for no other purpose, but only fenced off from the
field, which I assume to be the property of the owner of the
house. I should wish for time to consider before deciding that
on the conveyance of the house the right to use that road, not
being a way of necessity, would not pass under such words as
these ;" that is, the words "used, occupied, and enjoyed with,"
which were the words relied on in the case of James v. -Plant,
4 Ad. & El. 749; s. c. 5 B. & Ad. 791. In the later case of
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l1'alls v. Zelson, 19 W. R. 338; s. c. L. R. 6 Ch. at 1) . 174,
MErLmsrr, L. J., said: "We may also observe that in 1angley
v. .lammond,BRAMIWELL, B., OXpre sed an opinion, iii which we
concur, that even in the case of a right of way, if there was a
formed road made over the alleged servient tenement, to and
for the apparent use of the dominant tenement, a right of way
over such road might pass by a conveyance of the dominant
tenement with the ordinary general words." This is a mistake,
for the words in Langley v. Hammond were not ordinary, but
extraordinary, as they were in James v. Plant.
In 1earson v. Spencer, 11 W. R. 471 ; s. c. 3 B. & S. 762,
where the owner of a farm had divided it by his will into two
portions, and one portion was landlocked, so that it was necessary to pass over the other portion to reach it, and the devisor
had, during his life, used a way in a certain direction over that
portion, the right to use this way was held to pass by the devise
of the landlocked portion. This was distinctly an advance in
the doctrine, for it was held, not that a way merely passed by
the devise, but a particular way. In giving judgment, EnLE,
C. J., said: "1Wehave been much struck with the argument of
Mr. Afellish, in which he contended that, if this right of way
were taken as a right of way of necessity simply, the way
claimed by the defendant could not be maintained; because we
are inclined to concur with him that a way of necessity, strictly
so called, ends with the necessity for it, and the direction in
which the plaintiff says the way ought to go would so end. But
we sustain the judgment of the court below on the construction and effect of James Pearson's will, taken in connection
with the mode in which the premises were enjoyed at the time
of the will. The testator had a unity of possession of all this
property; he intended to create two distinct firms with two distinct dwelling-houses, and to leave one to the plaintiff and the
other to the party under whom the defendant claims. The way
claimed by the defendant was the sole approach that was at that
time used for the house and farm devised to him. Then the
devise of the farm contained, under the circumstances, a devise
of a way to it, and we think the way in question passed with
that devise. It falls under that class of implied grants where
there is no necessity for the right claimed, but where the teneVOL. XXXVI.-38
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ment is so constructed as that parts of it involve a necessary
dependence, in order to its enjoyment in the state it is in when
devised, upon the adjoining tenement. These are rights which
are implied, and we think that the farm devised to the party
under whom the defendant claims, could not be enjoyed without
dependence on the plaintiff's land, of a right of way over it in
the customary manner." This, then, is a distinct decision of
the Court of Exchequer Chamber that a way following a particular and defined route, and which is not a way of necessity,
may nevertheless pass by implied grant from an owner who has
unity of possession both of the close granted and of the adjoining close.
In the case of TIrheeldon v. Burrows, 28 W. R. 196; s. c.
12 Ch. D. 31, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between
the effect of an implied grant and an implied reservation with
regard to the much-contested question as to what rights are so
reserved to a vendor, and THESIGER, L. J., in the course of his
judgment, which was approved by the rest of the court, uses
this language: "We have had a considerable number of cases
cited to us, and out of them I think that two propositions may
be stated as what I call the general rules governing cases of
this kind. The first of these rules is, that on the grant by the
owner of a tenement of part of that tenement as it is then used
and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous
and apparent easements (by which, of course, I mean quasieasements)," and this interpretation by means of the term
"quasi-easements" was needed, because a man can have no easements over his own land, "or, in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the
property granted, and which have been and are at the time of
the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of
the part granted. The second proposition is that, if the grantor
intends to reserve any grant over the tenement granted, it is his
duty to reserve it expressly in the grant;" that is to say, he
draws a distinction between an implied grant and an implied
reservation. The point again came before the Court of Appeal
in Bayley v. Great WFestern Railway, 26 Ch. D. 434 ; s. c. 32
W. R. Dig. 227. There the railway company had purchased a
piece of land on which was a stable, and the property had been
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conveyed to the company, together with "all rights, members,
or appurtenances to tile hereditaments belonging or occupied or
enjoyed as part, parcel, or member thereof." The vendor had
many years previously made a private road from the highway
to the stable over his own land for his own convenience, and
had used it ever since. The soil of the road was not conveyed
to the company, and no express mention of it was made in the
conveyance. It was held that a right of way passed to the
company under the general words in the conveyance, and Bow.EN,
L. J., in the course of his judgment, said: "This particular
case is not a case of a way of necessity, though I do not say that
there might not be ways which would pass by implication as
ways of necessity, even if they were only reasonably necessary
and not physically necessary." I do not intend to rest my
decision in this ease on that dictum, the way here not being, in
my opinion, a way of necessity. But there is another case
before the Court of Appeal, Ford v. .fceropolilan Railway Co.,
3.1 W. R. 426 ; s. c. 17 Q. B. D. 12, where a house was divided
into two blocks, and part of the back block had been demised
without any express grant of access thereto. Access was gained
through a hall from the street. The railway company, in the
exercise of their compulsory powers, removed the hall, and by
thus injuring the access to the lessees' rooms lessened their
value. It was held that the access through the hall was not a
way of necessity, but was in the nature of a continuous and
apparent easement which passed under the demise of the rooms,
and that the company's interference with this quasi-easement
was sufficient to give rise to a valid claim for compensation.
And this decision did not rest upon the use of any extraordinary
words in the lease, such as "used or enjoyed therewith," but
was based on this, that the court, looking at the whole of the
surrounding facts, and finding a formed way to the rooms existing over the property, held that this constituted a right of
access, although there were no special words in the lease referring to it, or any general words which would carry such a
right. And it is doubtful whether general words could
have any such effect. In Thomson v. TMaterlow, 16 W. R. 686;
s. c. L. 1R. 6 Eq. 36, Lord flOMILLY said that he did not
think such words would constitute a grant of a right of way
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that had not previously existed as a right. This dictum was
cummented on by Lord BLACKBURN in Kay v. Oxley, L. R.
10 Q. 1B. 360, where he says :-" I cannot agree that, upon the
construction of words like those in the conveyance here in
question, they cannot as a matter of law create a right of way
that did not previously exist as a right." I leave this contest
of authority as I find it, but it is clearly law that a right of passage over a particular formed way like this is, leading to gates
in a wall, part of the demised premises, and without which
those gates would be perfectly useless, may pass by implied
grant, although in some sense not a continuous and apparent
easement, or rather because, being a formed road, it is considered in contemplation of the authorities as so passing in the
absence of any general words at all. These gardens, although
not absolutely inaccessible, could only be reached through the
houses themselves, unless through the gates. That a right of
way through these gates was intended to pass by the assignment, and that the owners of Cottisbrook and Westbourne were
intended to have the use of this back way is, looking at the
facts, beyond all doubt. Then, this not being for all purposes
a way of necessity, do I want an express grant? It seems to
me that the authorities are clear that an express grant is not
needed. I hold, therefore, that the right to use this back way
in the same way in which it was used at the date of the deed
did pass by implied grant under the indenture of the 14th of
December, 1878, and I so decide. The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the defendant is not entitled to use this way to
Augusta-road. This I cannot grant. On the contrary, I hold
that he is entitled to use the way, and I make a declaration accordingly. The plaintiff must pay the costs of the action.
Action dismissed.
The American law on the subject
of easements by implied grant, presents four different classes of cases,
and it may not be easy to reconcile
all the decisions on the subject: See
Dillmaa v. 1hoffman, 38 Wise. 573
(1875).
I. The first class is where the grant
is of some estate described in general

language, and not by any specific
metes and bounds; such as a conveyance of" a mill," a "dwelling house,"
etc. In such cases all the paris, and
parcels of the mill, house, etc., pass
as parts of the description, although
they mayextend over, under or across
the remaining land of the grantor.
They are not exactly "easements"
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over the other premises of the grantor,
since he owned the fee in both premises, and no man can have an easement in his own land. They are not
exactly " appurtenances," in a proper
legal sense of that word, but rather
part or parcel of the thing conveyed;
an extension, branch or arm thereof,
reaching out into the other land of
the grantor; and they would equally
pass, therefore, whether there were
or were not any such words used in
the deed, as "with all easements or
privileges and appurtenances attached
thereto." See Phi/brick v. Ewing, 97
Mass. 133 (1867), a water pipe leading
to the house conveyed; _3AcPherson v.
Acker, ]NacArth. & Mack. 150; s. c.
48 Am. Rep. 749 (1879). And see
Francisv. Ihayward, 48 Law T. R. 297
(1882). It was on this ground held in
Ctderwdl v. Lockington, 24 Upp. Can.
C. P. 611, that a demise of a house and
premises, might include a right to use
a stove pipe running into and through
adjoining premises.
In other words, the grant of a principal thing carries with it all that is
necessary to the beneficial enjoyment
of the thing granted, which it is in the
power of the grantor to convey by more
apt and specific words. Therefore, if a
party builds a mill on his own land
and cuts an artificial channel or waste
way through his other land, to carry
off the water from the mill, and then
sells the "mill," without including
the land through which the race way
runs, nor mentioning the race way
specifically, the right to use it passes
with the mill as a privilege defacto
annexed thereto, and necessary to
its beneficial use: New Ipswich Factory
v. Batchelder, 3 N. H. 190 (1825).
And see a very elaborate examination of the authorities upon this point
in Dunklee v. Wilton R. R. Co., 24 N.
H. 439 (1852), in which some of the
earlier cases in Massachusetts, Con-

necticut and New York are doubted.
And this rule was adopted in Young
v. Wilson, 21 Grant Ch. 144 (1874) in
a carefully considered case.
In LBlaines Lessce v. Chambers, I S.
& R. 174 (1814), it was declared, that,
by the devise of a "grist mill with
the appurtenances," everything would
pass which was necessary for the full
and free enjoyment of the mill, such
as the d.im, water, race way, a proper
portion of ground around the mill for
loading and unloading, etc., as in fact
used by the testator in his lifetime.
And this was affirmed in Pickering v.
Stapler, 5 S. & R. 107 (1819). See
also Stickler v. Todd, 10 S. & R. 70
(1823) ; Le Roy v. Platt, 4 Paige, 77
(1833); 3organ v. Mason, 20 Ohio,
401 (1851); Elliott v. Sallee, 14 Ohio
St. 10 (1862); Simmons v. Cloonan, 81
N. Y. 557 (1880). The law is well
stated and the authorities collated in
the late case of Jackbon v. Trullinger,
9 Oreg. 394 (1881).
So a grant of a "mill site," carries
not only the soil under the mill, but
also so much land, if owned by the
grantor, as is necessary for a mill
pond, and for carrying on the mill
business: Whitney v. Olney, 3 Mason,
280 (1823); Blake v. Clark, 6 Greenl.
436 (1830); Jackson v. Vermilyea, 6
Cow. 677 (1827) ; Mafddoz v. Goddard,
15 Me. 218 (1839) ; Forbush v. Lombard, 13 MNet. 114 (1847). Though
not neccessarily all the land adjoining,
which the grantor had in fact used
with his mill: Plimpton v. Converse,
42 Vt.712(1870). It is a question of
practical necessity in each case:
Toorhecs v. Burchard,55 N.Y. (1873).
Possibly a deed of a mill site, by
specific metes and bounds, and containing no allusion to the use of a reservoir above, owned by the grantor,
might not pass any such right though
the mill stream were small and the
use of the reservoir highly essential
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for the mill: Brace v. Yale, 4 Allen,
393 (1862).
In Oakley v. Stanley, 5 Wend. 524
(1830), it was held, that a conveyance
of a mill and dain, which at the time
flowed other land of the grantor,
carried a right to continue such flowage to the same height, the main
value of the premises conveyed consisting in the mill privilege, which
would be destroyed by cutting down
the dam. It is partly on this ground,
that the outside wall of a leased store
or building passes to the lessee, as
well as the inside, and therefore the
lessor could not subsequently let the
outside wall to other parties, forsigns,
bill posters, etc., or use it himself:
Biddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503
(1873); Baldwin v. Arorgan, 43 Hun,
355 (1887); Lowell v.Strahan, S. Jud.
Ct. Mass., June 30, 1887.
II. The second class of cases, is
where the estate granted, is definitely
and specifically described by metes
and bounds, and not by some broad,
general description, as before stated;
but in which the quasi-easement,
privilege or use of the remaining
land of the grantor, is actually necessary for the proper use and enjoyinent of the estate specifically described in the deed. Here all agree
that the war, drain or other easement, which was actually used by the
grantor, when he owned both estates,
over or through the one retained,
does pass to the grantee of the estate
for which such way, drain, etc., was
originally constructed or used by the
grantor. Thecaseof Tlayerv..Payne,
2 Cush. 327 (1848), furnishes a good
illustration of this rule. There the
owner of two adjoining lots, from one
ofwhich an underground drain existed
through the other to a convenient
outlet, sold the upper lot, without any
specific mention of the drain, retaining the lower lot through which the

drain was laid. The drain being out
of repair, the grantee of the upper
lot entered upon the lower lot of the
grantor to repair the drain, for which
he was sued in trespass by the grantor,
and it was held that the right to use
the drain passed with the grant, if it
was necessary for the beneficial enjoyrent of the house and land
granted; that is, whether another
drain could be conveniently made
from the granted premises with reasonable labor and expense without
going through the grantor's remainingland. And see.Leonardv. Lfonard,
7 Allen, 283 (1863). Kelly v. Dunning,
43 N. J. Eq. 62, is much like Thayer v.
.Payne, and the excellent opinion of
VAN FLEET, V. C., is well worthy of
perusal. Hair v. Downing, S. Ct.
N. C., May 21, 1887, is similar.
In Brady v. Sharp, 9N. J. Eq. 10,
and 10 Id. 206 (1854), C. S. died,
leaving a farm, through which there
was an artificial water-course. Part
of the farm through which the artificial water-course eztended, was set
off to the heirs by proceedings in the
Orphans' Court. The other part was
sold under an order of court, and it
was held, that the purchaser of the
last tract became entitled to a continued use of the water-course as it existed at the time of sale, it being
proved that it could not "be beneficially enjoyed without the use of the
aqueduct."
So, in Coolidge v. Hager, 43 Vt. 9
(1870), it was held, that a grant of a
dwelling-house and lot by a warranty
deed, with the privileges and appurtenances, conveys a right to an aqueduct
then running to the land granted from
a spring on other land of the grantor,
as an appurtenance to the estate
granted. The same had been previously held in The 7 rmont Cent. R.
B. Co. v. Hills, 23 Vt.681 (1851), in
which the contrary case of .ilanning v.
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,Smith, 6 Conn.2S9, was much doubted.
See also, )e Lure v. Bradbury, 25 N.
J. E1. 70 (1874) ; Central PailroadCo.
v. I'dentite, 29 N. J. L. 561 (1862).
These cases rest upon the ground
of a "reasonable necessity" for the
continual use of the old drain or aqueduct by the new proprietor; and
therefore if the latter could build
an equally beneficial drain or way,
etc., to his own laud, with reasonable
labor and expense, he does nt by
such grant acquire a right to continue to use the old one. See Johns'n v. Jordan, 2 Met. 23-1 (18411);
R-1adall v. .feL.aughlin, 10 Allen, 366
(1865); DollIlT v. Boston & Jraine 1.
.R., 68 Me. 173 (1878). Some of the
cases may require more, and some
less of a necessity, in order to imply
a grant, but whatever shades of difference there maybe in tlecases, it may
be safely said, that when the quasi
easement is apparent, continuous and
practically necessary, it passes by implication, although the deed is silent
upon the subject. See the late case of
Sarlerlinv. Baxter, 76 Va. 299 (18S2).
III. The third class of cases, is
where the quasi easement claimed
by the grantee, is not so reasonably
"necessary" for the use and enjoyment of the estate granted as in the
last class, but is only highly convenient
and bneficial thereto. Here also there
is some difirence of opinion; some
holding that if the qutsi easement is
apparent and continuous,it passes with
the grant, though not necessary;
while many require that the alleged
easement must have been necessary
to the est:Lte granted. In support of
the first view, perhaps Lampinan v.
Mllilks, 21 N. Y. 505 (1860), is the
leading case in America. There A.
owned ai tract of land, containing
about forty acres, through a cornerof
which a small brook naturally flowed,
but lie diverted the brook from its

natural course into a different direction through his said tract. Ten
years after such diversion he sold the
corner lot, through which the brook
formerly flowed, to L., who built a
house upon it. Subsequently A. sold
the balance of the forty. acre tract to
MI. with the water running in the
new artificial channel. Four years
afterwards 'M. dammed up this artificial channel and caused the water to
flow back in its former course and it
overflowed L.'s house-lot. It was held
that L. by his purchase of A. with the
water then flowing over A.'s remaining land, to the benefit of the corner
lot, acquired a right to have it so
continue to flow and that neither A.
nor his second grantee 'M. could return the water to its original course,
to the injury of A.'s house-lot. Cave
v. Crafts,53 Cal. 135 (1878), is much
like it. But Lanipinan v. Milks has
often been thought an extreme case,
and sometimes wholly repudiated:
and in New York even, the tendency
is not to extend it.
It had previously been held, more
obviously by the same court, in Hutremcier v. Ailbro, 18 -N.Y.48; s. c. 2
Bosw. 546 (185S), that, when several
persons owned three lots in New York
city, fronting on a public street, and
abutting on an alley way in the rear,
leadingout to aside street, which had
been used for many years as a means
of access to the rear of said lots, and
the owners made partition among
themselves, of three lots which referred
to the alley as a boundary, but did not
include the land thereof within the
stated metes and bounds, each owner
continued to have a right of way over
such alley to his own premises, the
same being then open, apparent to
observation, and in actual use by the
owners for more than forty years.
This is much like the principal case.
Kiefer v. Imboff, 2d P'enu. St. 438
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(1856), is much like it. So is Cihae
v. Klekr, 117 111. 643 (1886).
The question, whether a way ever
other landis so "continuous and apparent" as to fall within the rule that
it will pass, seems to be a question of
fact in each case. It may be so well
worn, and so expensively constructed,
and so constantly used, that the
buyer of the adjoining land might
well be supposed to contract with
reference to it, and the owner of the
land over which it extends mightwell
be apprised that he was taking the
estate subject to that burden. If so,
it seems to rest on the same ground
as water pipes, mill races, etc. See
Phillips v. Phillips,48 Penn. St. 186
(1864) ; Kieffer v. Imhoff, supra; McCarty v. Kitchenman, 47 Penn. St. 239
(1864); Pennsylvania P. B. Co. v.
Jones, 50 Id. 417 (1865) ; Overdeer v.
Updegraff, 69 Id. 119 (1871); Cannon
v. Boyd, 73 Id. 179 (1873) ; Thompson
v. M3iner, 30 Iowa, 386 (1870). This
view was elaborately maintained in
Harris v. Smith, 40 Upp. Can. Q. B.
33 (1876), where the authorities are
fully examined. And see Goodall v.
Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219 (1880); Worne v.
Marsh, 6 Phila. 33 (1865) ; The Chureh
v. Yonneida, 6 Id. 557 (1868) ; Building Association v. Getty, 11 Id. 305
(1876); Robinson v. Thrailkill, 110
Ind. 117; Dillman v. Hoffman, 38
,Vise. 559 (1875); J"arstadt v. Smith,
51 Id. 96 (1881); Galloway v. Bonested, 65 Id. 79 (1886), in which many
authorities are cited.
In Havens v. .lein, 51 How. Pr. R.
82 (1875), A. owned two adjoining
lots, one with a building on it, the
windows of which overlooked the
other, and the window shutters when
open, swung out over it, and fire
escapes also led from the building
down into the vacant lot. He sold
the lot and building, retaining the
other, which he subsequently sold to

a third person, no mention being
made in any of the deeds, of any easements or incumbrances. Held, that
the buyer of the lot and building acquired a right over the vacant lot for
his shutters and fire escapes, as used
at the time of the purchase. Thisis
much like the case of United States v.
Appleton, 1 Sumn. 492 (1813), a leading case on this particular phase of
the subject.
The importance of the visibility
and knowledge of an existing privilege or benefit over other land, in
order to pass it, unless it is strictly a
matter of necessity, is also well illustrated by Tabor v. Bradley, 18 N. Y.
109 (1858). There W. had erected a
mill and mill dam on land of H.
which flowed back on I.'s land. H.
conveyed to W. the land where his
mill was situated, by defined metes and
bounds, but without mentioning the
mill, dam, or water privilege in any
way, and II. did not then know his
remaining land was flooded by W.'s
mill pond. Hdd, that the deed did
not convey any right to W. to continue to flow the land of H.
On the other hand, if the alleged
easement is not continuous and apparent, and is not strictly necessary
to the estate granted, it is held in
many cases, not to pass. And ordinary
ways over other land of the grantor
have often been thought to be within
this class. See the carefully considered case of Outerbridge v. Phelps,13
Abb. N. C. 117 (1883). And see In
re Francie'sAppeal, 96 Penn. St. 200
(1880); Adams's Appeal, 7 W. N. C.
(1879), S. Ct. Penna., March 3, 1879.
So in Fetters v. .Ilumphreys, 18 N. J.
Eq. 260 (1867). A. owned a dwellinghouse and stable, used in connection
with the house, and he had constructed and used a way from the barn
to the street, over other land of his.
He devised to his wife "the house
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and lot occupied by me." The barn
could be reached from thestreet by constructing a new way through a flower
garden on the premises. The other
land over which the way to barn was
constructed, he devised to other parties. It was held that his widow did
not take, under that devise, any i ight
of way over the land devised to
others; that it was not a way of necessity, nor an "apparent and continuous" easement, that it had no
legal existence as a right of way at his
death, and that the words of the devise were not sufficient to include it.
This was affirmed in 19 N. J. Eq.
471 (1868) and the authorities examined. See also Oliter v. Hook, 47 Md.
301 (1877) ; Standiford v. Goudy, 6 W.
Va. 36-4 (1873).
In Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 21 N.J.
Law, 133 (1S47), a case elaborately
argued, S. owned two adjoining lots,
both bounding on a highway, and he
had been accustomed to pass from one,
on which was his mansion, over the
other, to and from the road. After his
death, the plaintiff bought the dwelling-house and lot, "with the appurtenances," and sometime afterwards
the defendant acquired the premises over which S. had passed and repassed, and closed up the way. Held,
that the plaintiff by his deed acquired
no right of way over the other land.
In Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443
(1821), it was held, that a conveyance of a specific tract, described by
meets and bounds, but carved out of
a large tract owned by the grantor,
did not carry a right of way or other
easement in or over the remaining
land of the grantor, which was a
matter of convenience, and importance even to the land granted, but
not really "necessary" thereto. In
this case, there was a well and outhouse on the land retained by the
grantor, which had been used before
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the conveyance by the occupants of
both estates. And the deed of the
other tract was, " with all the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging," but it was held the grantee
had no right to use the well and outhouse after such conveyance. See
also O'.?orke v. Smith, 11 R. 1. 259.
In Denton v. Leddell, 23 N. J. Eq.
67 (1872), the rule was stated to be,
"that if the owner of a tract of land,
of which one part has had the benefit of a drain, water-pipe, or watercourse, or other artificial advantage
in the nature of an easement through
or in the other part, sells or devises
either part, an easement is created by
implication in or to the other part.
And this is the case when the servient
,part is the one sold or devised. But
this is confined to continuousand apparent easements." So in Parsons v. Johnson, 63 N. Y. 62 (1877).
That nothing passes by the word
"appurtenances" except such incorporeal easements, or rights, or privileges as are strictly necessary and essential to the proper enjoyment of
the estate granted; and that a mere
convenience is not sufficient to thus
create such a right or easement, was
again asserted by the Court of Appeals
in New York, in the very late case of
Root v. Wadharns, Ct. App. N. Y.,
November 29,1887. And see Griffiths
v. Morrison, 106 N. Y. 165 (1887).
IV. The fourth class of cases is
where the grantor claims a right or
easement over the estate granted,by an
"implied reservation," as it is called,
the deed being silent upon the subject. And here the prevailing rule in
America (contrary to Pyer v. Carter,
1 II. & N. 916), that although the alleged easement over the granted land
be both "continuous and apparent,"
yet if it be not actually necessary for
the estate retained by the grantor, the
latter does not retain any right to
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such easement, by implied reservation
from his own grant.
Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen, 364
(1863). is an important case on this
point, in which it was held that if the
owner of two adjoining estates,
through one of which an underground
drain exists in favor of the other,
conveys the one containing the
drain, with full covenants of warranty, retaining the other, he does
not by implication retain any right to
use tfie drain for the estate retained,
unless it was necessary to the enjoyment thereof, was annexed de facto to
the estate so retained, and was in actual use at the time of the grant. And
ty
no "necessi " can be deemed to exist, if a similar privilege can be secured by reasonable trouble and expense. This is undoubtedly the law
See Randall v.
of Massachusetts.
.McLaughlin, 10 Allen, 366 (1865);
.Parkerv. Bennett, 11 Id. 319 (1865) ;
Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 291 (1878).
Scott v. Beutd, 23 Gratt. 1 (1873) is
much like Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen,
364. And see Hardy v. 3l1c6ullough,
23 Gratt. 259 (1873); Shoemaker v.
Shoemaker, 11 Abb. N. C. 80 (1882).
And the same has recently been held
in Maine: Warren v. Blake, 54 Ie.
276 (1866), a valuable case approving
(arbrey v. Willis.
So in Burr v. M£ills, 21 Wend. 290
(1839), it was held, that if an owner
of land with a mill and mill-pond
upon it, conveys away that portion
which is flowed by the pond, retaining the mill, lie does not retain by
implication any right to continue to
flow the portion so sold. "He might as
well," said the court, "claim to plow
and crop the land sold.' Preble v.
Reed, 17 Me. 175, is much like it.
In Butterworth v. Crawford,46 N. Y.
853 (1871), A. owned two lots 83 and
85 on a street in New York city,
with a privy vault under the dividing

line between them, which was used
by both estates. He conveycd to C.
lot 85, through which an underground
drain extended from said vault to the
public sewer, not expressly reserving
any right to the drain. He subsequently sold lot 83 to B. Subsequently C. in building on his own
land cut off the drain, for which B.
sued him. Held, that when A. sold
the first lot to C. without mentioning
the druin, he did not impliedly retain
a right to continue the drain, and did
not give any such right to B. And
see Schrymsen v. Phelps, 62 How. rr.
R. 1 (1881).
On the other hand in Seibert v.
Levan, 8 Penn. St. 383 (1848), quite
contrary to Burr v. .ills, 21 Wend.
292, it was distinctly decided, that if
A. owning two tracts, builds a mill
with a dam and race way to supply the
same, and afterwards sells the land
containing the dam and race way, but
retaining the mill, by deed with no
express reservation of the dam, or
artificial race way, lie still retains the
right to use the same; and the grantee
is liable for obstructing or diverting
the water. Two judges dissented.
Still stronger in the same line is
Seynour v. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439
(1861) in which the owner of a paper
mill had by an artificial channel,
conveyed the water thereto from a
spring lot, and sold the latter, retaining the mill; it was held, that the
purchaser of the spring lot took it
subject to the burden of the privilege,
and had no right to interfere with the
continued use of the water by the
grantor for his mill.
This was undoubtedly the French
law, destenation du p re de famille, as
explained by Pardessus, Traite des
Servitudes, 288; but such apparently
is not the common law of England, or
of America.
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